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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
David Zivkovic appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In Oneida County Case No. CR FE-2007 -00041, Zivkovic was charged 
with and pled guilty to Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, in violation 
of I.C. § 1B-3316, and was admitted to the Oneida County DUI/Drug Court. (R., 
pp.2, 29.) After Zivkovic was terminated from the program, the district court 
entered his conviction and imposed sentence. (R., p.29.) Zivkovic did not 
appeal from the entry of his felony conviction. (R., p.2.) Zivkovic filed a petition 
for post-conviction relief, alleging that that I.C. § 1B-3316 was unconstitutional as 
a bill of attainder and in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions, that his termination from the DUIiDrug Court 
violated his due process rights, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to assert these claims. (R., pp.1-B.) 
After the state filed its answer (R., pp.9-13), which included within it a 
motion for summary dismissal, and Zivkovic filed a response (R., pp.16-20), the 
district court issued its Notice of Intent to Dimiss Zivkovic's petition (R., pp.2B-
36). After giving Zivkovic more than twenty days to respond to its notice of intent 
to dismiss, and receiving no response, the district court summarily dismissed 
Zivkovic's petition. (R., pp.37-3B.) Zivkovic timely appealed. (R., pp.39-43.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Due to its length, Zivkovic's statement of the issues is not repeated here. 
Zivkovic's statement of the issues on appeal appears on page seven of his 
Appellant's Brief. 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 





The District Court Properly Dismissed The Claims 
Presented In Zivkovic's Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court summarily dismissed Zivkovic's petition for post-
conviction relief, finding that Zivkovic's claim that his dismissal from the DUIIDrug 
Court should have been raised on direct appeal, and finding that Zivkovic's 
claims regarding the constitutionality of the statutes were without merit. The 
district court properly dismissed all of the claims contained in Zivkovic's petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of an order summarily dismissing a post-conviction application, 
the appellate court will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of 
material fact exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief 
be granted. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 
1992). The appellate court will freely review the district court's application of the 
law. 19.:. 
C. General Legal Standards In Post-Conviction Cases 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in 
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). 
However, a post-conviction petition differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil 
action because the petition must contain much more than lOa short and plain 
3 
statement of the claim." Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 
491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, a post-conviction petition must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner and affidavits, 
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the 
petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the 
petition. I.C. § 19-4903. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove 
by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 
794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). 
D. Legal Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Under Idaho Code § 
19-4906 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the 
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. StatE? v. LePage, 
138 Idaho 803, ~06, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). Summary dismissal is 
permissible only when the petitioner's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact, which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 
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Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 
Idaho 145,146,754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Additionally, the "application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 
2002), review denied (2003); LePage, 138 Idaho at 807 (citing Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994)). Also, allegations are 
insufficient and subject to dismissal when they do not justify relief as a matter of 
law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216,1220 (1990); Cooper v. 
State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Dunlap v. State, 126 
Idaho 901, 906, 894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are 
inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 
647,873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369, 372 
(Ct. App. 1986). If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential 
element on which he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is 
appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,592,861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 
1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than 
personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is 
appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,87-81,844 P.2d 706, 716-17 (1993). 
When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to 
survive summary dismissal, she must allege a genuine issue of material fact that 
"(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was 
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deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency 
prejudiced the applicant's case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 
P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). "To establish deficient 
assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his attorney's conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. This objective standard 
embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent." 
kL. "To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable probability that 
but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would 
have been different." kL. "Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file 
or pursue certain motions, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not 
have been granted, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland 
test." Schoger v. State, _ P.3d _, 2010 WL 337688 *8 (2010) (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
E. The District Court Correctly Dismissed The Claims Contained In Zivkovic's 
Petition For Post-Convition Relief 
The district court, in a well-researched and reasoned opinion, summarily , 
dismissed Zivkovic's petition, ruling that I.C. §§ 18-3316 and 18-310 were not 
Bills of Attainder nor did they violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (R., pp.28-36 
(attached as Appendix A).) The state adopts the district court's written opinion 
as its argument on appeal. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Zivkovic's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2010. 
b kah A. Cude 
eputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ih day of December, 2010, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DAVID ZIVKOVIC 
IDOC #20848 
ICC-D1-PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
RAC/pm 
ebekal:l A. Cude 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Case No. CV-2009-0053 
DECISION RE: POST CONVICTION 
PETITION CHALLENGING 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE 
STATUTE and NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO DISMISS 
The Court has received and reviewed Petitioner David Zivkovic's Post Conviction Petition 
Challenging Constitutionality of State Statute and Respondent State of Idaho's Answer. The 
State's .A~l1swer includes a request that the post conviction petition be summarily disrnissed. The 
Idaho appellate courts have stated that, rather than cornbining an Answer with a rnotion to 
dismiss a post-conviction petition, it is preferable for the State to file a rnotion separate frorn the 
answer and to identify it as a rnotion for summary disposition. See, Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007); Ridgley v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 3020738 (Idaho App. 2008). 
In the absence of a separate rnotion for summary disrnissal, it is this Court's practice, when it 
finds that sumrnary disrnissal is warranted, to not summarily disrniss the rnatter but to give the 
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petitioner twenty days notice of the intent to dismiss. That is what the Court will do here. 
BACKGROUND 
David Zivkovic was charged by a Prosecuting Attorney's Information with the felony of 
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Felon. The prosecutor filed the Information on February 
5,2007. Mr. Zivkovic pled guilty to the charged crime on February 23, 2007. The matter was 
held in abeyance and Zivkovic went into the Oneida County DUIlDrug Court. Ultimately, 
Zivkovic was terminated from the diversion court and sentenced on May 30, 2008, to a uniform 
term offive years, with three years fixed and two years indeterminate. On May 4, 2009, 
Zivkovic filed his Post Conviction Petition Challenging Constitutionality of State Statute. 
Zivkovic alleges that I.e. § 18-3316 and I.C. § 18-310 are unconstitutional. He 
alleges that his termination from diversionary court violated his due process rights. He requests 
that this Court overturn his conviction and vacate his sentence. The State disputes Zivkovic's 
claims. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A petition for post conviction relief is governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), I.e. 19-4901, et seq. Such a petition initiates a proceeding that is 
civil in nature. State v. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002); State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803,806,69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct.App. 2003). Under I.e. § 19-4901(a), a 
person who is convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime may institute a proceeding to secure relief 
based on a claim that the conviction was in violation of the state or federal constitutions or the 
laws of Idaho, or that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, 
that requires the vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of justice," among other 
grounds. 
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However, pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (b), a petition for post-conviction relief is not a 
substitute for appeal. A petitioner is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on 
a direct appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have 
reasonably been known at the time of the appeal. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 
P.3d 924, 925 (2001). Similarly, a post-conviction petitioner may not relitigate the same issues 
that were already presented in a direct appeal. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. 
I.C. § 19-4906 governs the pleadings and judgments on the pleadings in a post-conviction relief 
action. I. C. § 19-4906(b) permits a court to dismiss the action if the court is satisfied based on 
the record that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by any 
further proceedings. That section also requires that the court, as a prerequisite to dismissal, give 
the petitioner notice of intent to dismiss and provides twenty days during which the petitioner 
may respond. However, the court may summarily dispose of the petition upon the motion of 
either of the parties when, based on the record, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.e. § 19-4906( c). No notice ofintent to 
dismiss is required for a summary disposition under this section. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 275 (1995). 
Summary dismissal under I.C. § 19-4906(b) is the procedural equivalent of a motion for 
summary jUdgment. Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987); Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P .2d 898 (CLApp 1994). Thus, in determining whether to grant a 
motion to dismiss, a court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner and 
determine whether those facts would entitle the petitioner to relief if accepted as true. Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272,61 P.2d at 629; 
LePage, 138 Idaho at 806,69 P.3d at 1067. If the court finds that the accepted facts entitle the 
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petitioner to relief, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing, LePage, 138 Idaho at 806-
806,69 P.3d at 1067-1068. 
Summary dismissal of an application may be appropriate, even if the State does not 
controvert the petitioner's facts, because "the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions 
oflaw." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272,61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 P.3d at 1068. 
FurtJler, a petition is "subject to SllI!U'IULry dismissal if the petitioner ha<:; not presented evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears 
the burden of proof." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 604, 21 P.2d 924, 926 (2001). 
DISCUSSION 
Zivkovic begins his argument by alleging that I.e. § 18-3316 and I.e. § 18-310 are Bills 
of Attainer that violate the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. He did not raise this issue in the trial 
court prior to sentencing, Normally, that would end the inquiry into the matter. However, 
Zivkovic argues that the failure to raise the issue in the trial court constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which can be raised in post-conviction proceeding. It is also an issue that 
could and should have been raised on appeal but was not. This precludes Zivkovic from raising 
the issue in a post-conviction proceeding. See, Paridis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 
(1986). The Uniform Post-Conviction Proceeding Act is not a substitute for appeal. However, 
again, Zivkovic argues that this is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his trial and 
appellate counsel did not raise it. 
Although this issue was not properly raised in the trial court on the underlying conviction 
or on appeal, this Court will address it as part of the post-conviction proceeding. Zivkovic, in his 
Register No. CV2007-0004261-PC 
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petition, claims that I.C. § 18-3316 and I.C. § 18-310 violate both the Idaho Constitution and 
u.s. Constitution. However, his "analysis and supporting authority" makes no reference to the 
Idaho Constitution and makes no claim that the Idaho Constitution is to be read differently than 
the U.S. Constitution regarding bills of attainder and ex post facto protections. Therefore, this 
Court will address Zivkovic's claim as it relates to the U.S. Constitution. 
In u.s. v. Davis, 2001 WL 1662485 (6th Cir. 2001), defendant was convicted of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, His prior felony was a drug abuse offense for which he never 
went to prison. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
[T]here is no merit to Davis's bill-of-attainder allegation. Contrary 
to the defendant's argument before this court, [the statute] seeks to impose 
punishment upon individuals who have been adjudicated in a court of law 
as dangerous and who have taken the additional step of increasing the risk 
of violence to society in general by possessing firearms. Consequently, the 
defendant's actions, found by a jury beyond, not just his status, justify the 
criminal liability imposed upon him. [Emphasis in originaL] 
In u.s. v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001), the 7th Circuit addressed an appeal in 
which the defendant argued that the relevant statutes were ex post facto laws and invalid bills of 
attainder. The Court stated: 
[The statutes] are not ex post facto laws. Other circuits have reached this 
same conclusion. A law is not retroactive simply because it "draws upon 
antecedent facts for its operation." Instead, an ex post facto law 
retroactively defines criminal conduct or changes the punishment for a 
crime to the detriment of the defendant. 
N or is [the statute] a bill of attainder, which would be "a law that 
legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an individual 
without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. The statute does not 
determine guilt based on a previous felony conviction, nor does it remove 
the protections of a triaL 
Hemmings, at 594-95. 
In u.s. v. Munsterman, 177 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1999), the defendant had a prior 
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conviction for felony sex abuse. He was subsequently convicted of acquiring a firearm as a 
felon. He appealed claiming that the Oregon law making it illegal for a convicted felon to 
possess a firearm was a bill of attainder. The 9th Circuit stated: 
Legislative acts, no matter what their fonn, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as 
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder 
prohibited by the Constitution. US. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,85 S.Ct. 
1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). Three requirements must be met to establish 
a violation of the bill of attainder clause: specification of the affected 
persons, punish_ment, and Jack of a judicial trial. 
Munsterman, at 1141. Us. v. Brown is the case Zivkovic relies on for his position in 
Therefore, the 9th Circuit's review of Brown is meaningful here. The 9th Circuit 
In United States v. Brown, the Supreme Court invalidated as a bill of 
attainder a law that made it a crime for members of the Communist Party 
to serve as officers of labor unions. The Court reasoned that the statute 
does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person 
who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics shall not hold 
union offices, and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what 
persons have committed the specified acts or possess the specified 
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain tenns the persons 
who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union 
office without incurring criminal liability - members of the Communist 
Party. It noted "the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the 
Communist Party, or any other political organization, can be regarded as 
an alternative, but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable 
characteristics. " 
Contrary to Munstennan's argument, it does not follow that laws that 
impose disabilities on some persons or groups are necessary bills of 
attainder: "However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it 
surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection 
doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively 
burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals." 
In Brown, the Court specifically distinguished regulatory laws such as the 
conflict-of-interest laws prohibiting persons involved in underwriting 
securities from serving as directors or officers of national banks. ., . 
These decisions show that not every law the effect of which is to disable 
some persons or groups is a bill of attainder. ... [Citations omitted.] 
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matter. 
Munsterman, at 1141-43. The 9th Circuit concluded: 
[The challenged statutes] set forth a rule generally applicable to all persons 
possessing a certain characteristic, i.e., having been indicted for a felony. 
They are reasonably calculated to achieve a nonpunitive public purpose, 
i.e., to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who, having been 
indicted for felonies, may "have a somewhat greater likelihood than other 
citizens to misuse firearms." 
State Courts have followed the line of federal cases that have upheld statutes prohibiting 
felons from possessing firearms. For example, in State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348 (1999), the 
Supreme Court of Iowa held that even though a defendant became a felon prior to the effective 
date of Iowa's statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, that did not make the statute 
an ex post facto law. In so holding, the court reasoned that "so long as the actual crime for which 
the defendant is being sentenced occurred after the effective date of the new statute, IS no 
ex post facto violation." In Swartz, as in our case, there is no claim that the possession of the 
firearm occurred prior to the enactment of the statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a 
firearm. Thus, there is no ex post facto violation. Also in Swartz, the Court addressed the bill of 
attainder argument: 
The issue as it relates to statutes barring possession of firearms by felons 
was determined adversely to defendant's contention in United States v. 
Donofrio, 450 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1971). There, the court declared: 
Appellant misconceives the thrust ofthe bill of attainder 
prohibition. Laws regulating the conduct of convicted felons have 
long been upheld as valid exercises of the legislative function. The 
prohibitions of the bill of attainder clause relate only to penal laws 
which are described as those laws which inflict a disability for the 
purpose of punishment. If the disability is designed to accomplish 
some other legitimate government purpose it should stand .... 
Such an activity is presented in the instant case, the regulation of 
guns in the hands of those previously convicted of felonies. 
Donofrio, at 351. 
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Convicted felons have been making the same arguments that Zivkovic makes in his post 
conviction 'proceeding for over 30 years. Courts have regularly rejected those arguments. It was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel to not assert these arguments in the trial court or on appea1. 
The statutes under which Zivkovic was convicted are not unconstitutional. 
As stated above, the State did not file a separate motion seeking summary dismissal but 
instead included that motion in its Answer. Therefore, this court will not summarily dismiss this 
matter, but will give petitioner twenty days from the date of this order, until November 12,2009, 
to reply to this proposed dismissal by providing legal authority showing that the Court's decision 
IS wrong. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED October 19,2009. 
District Judge 
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